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ABSTRACT
Technological advancement is widely viewed as an essential
component to any effective climate change strategy. However,
there is no consensus as to the degree to which the law should
promote technological innovation and development. This iBrief
analyzes government involvement in encouraging such technology
and divides the various policies into four categories. On one end
are policies that rely mainly on market forces to encourage
scientific advancement naturally, requiring minimal government
involvement. A second category of policies involves technological
development promoted indirectly through laws addressing climate
change generally. A third type of policy involves directly offering
government funding and financing for technological research and
development. These three methods are currently the most popular
means of encouraging scientific development in this field.
Recently, however, there have been increasing calls for major
government action of the scale of such programs as the Apollo
Project. This iBrief classifies such proposals as a fourth category
of policies encouraging technological solutions to climate change:
the creation of institutional structures dedicated to bringing about
rapid, radical technological advancements.

INTRODUCTION
The world faces an imminent climate crisis. 2 Recent reports
indicate that climate change is occurring at faster rates than previously
¶1

1
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insightful comments.
2
E.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 8–10 (2007) (describing
recent scientific findings showing stronger indications of the existence and
effects of climate change); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 2 (2007) (“An overwhelming body of scientific
evidence now clearly indicates that climate change is a serious and urgent
issue.”).
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anticipated. 3 Because of this, many experts are calling for a major,
government-sponsored scientific effort. Two such proponents, Ted
Nordhaus and Michael Schellenberger, are calling for a complete shift in
environmental thinking, and suggest framing climate change “as the result
of too little clean economic development” rather than as a consequence of
overdevelopment and over-industrialization. 4 Driven by the goal of
achieving dominance in space within a fixed, short period of time, the
Apollo Project was an impressive, government-coordinated initiative that
accelerated technological advance and made travel to the moon possible
eight years after President Kennedy launched the program. 5
In their book, Apollo’s Fire, Bracken Hendricks and Congressman
Jay Inslee argue that the urgency of global warming requires an initiative of
the same magnitude as the Apollo Project and the space race of the 1960s. 6
In many ways, Hendricks and Inslee’s analogy to climate change is
convincing. Cold War security concerns were a major, if not the primary,
motivation behind the Apollo Project. 7 National security was also the main
driver of a less widely honored, but no less impressive scientific feat: the
creation of the atomic bomb through the Manhattan Project. 8 Even the
Bush Administration’s Department of Defense has warned of the security
threats that would result from climate change. 9 Nevertheless, in many
respects climate change is a fundamentally different problem. 10 Because of
¶2

3

See, e.g., James E. Overland & Muyin Wang, Future Regional Arctic Sea Ice
Declines, 34 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L17705, Sept. 8, 2007, at 1; STERN,
supra note 2, at 8 (“Results from new risk based assessments suggest there is a
significant chance that the climate system is more sensitive than was originally
thought.”).
4
TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SCHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE
DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 127 (2007)
(emphasis removed).
5
Id. at xvii.
6
JAY INSLEE & BRACKEN HENDRICKS, APOLLO’S FIRE 2–3 (2008).
7
See, e.g., Roger D. Launius, Historical Dimensions of the Space Age, in SPACE
POLITICS AND POLICY: AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE 3, 16 (Eligar Sadeh ed.,
2002).
8
JEFF HUGHES, THE MANHATTAN PROJECT: BIG SCIENCE AND THE ATOM BOMB
53 (2002).
9
PETER SCHWARTZ & DOUG RANDALL, AN ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE
SCENARIO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY 2
(2003) (exploring how “an abrupt climate change scenario could potentially destabilize the geo-political environment, leading to skirmishes, battles, and even
war due to resource constraints”).
10
See, e.g., Chi-Jen Yang & Michael Oppenheimer, A “Manhattan Project” for
Climate Change?, 80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 199, 200 (2007) (“Using the
Manhattan Project as a rhetorical symbol [in the climate change context] might
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this, commentators have argued that dramatic institutional changes and
enormous governmental funding may not be the best means of encouraging
the development of climate change technology. 11
Much of the climate change policy discussions and proposals in
recent years have focused on investing in lower risk, more predictable, and
steadier methods of technological advancement. 12 However, there are no
standard conceptual categories for the types of policies used to encourage
such advancement. 13 This iBrief will attempt to categorize technological
development relating to climate change as coming from four main sources:
(1) market-related incentives that will exist with little to no government
interaction, (2) technological progress indirectly resulting from climate
change laws, (3) direct government encouragement of private development
through financial incentives, and (4) the creation of government institutions
charged with ensuring the development of major technological progress.
¶3

I. NATURAL MARKET INCENTIVES
¶4
A certain amount of technological progress will inevitably stem
from economic incentives to cater to a growing market for environmentally
friendly technology. 14 “Perhaps the most powerful force driving today’s
clean-tech growth is simple economics. As a general trend, clean-energy
costs are falling as the costs of fossil fuel energy are going up.” 15 With an
increasing demand for clean technology, there is a growing opportunity to
make money in green industries. To a large degree, pure market forces,

make sense to create a rallying point for the body politic. But good politics is not
equivalent to wise policy.”).
11
Id.
12
See JOHN C. ALIC, DAVID C. MOWERY & EDWARD S. RUBIN, U.S.
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION POLICIES: LESSONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 1
(2003) (“[I]ncremental innovations . . . are more common, have great
significance for long-term economic growth, and respond in consistent ways to
economic signals and public policies. If only because radical innovations are
uncommon and unpredictable, incremental innovations are the most appropriate
policy targets.”). See also infra Parts II and III (explaining that the majority of
proposed climate change legislation has focused on developing more
predictable, less revolutionary technology).
13
See ALIC, MOWERY & RUBIN, supra note 12, at 15 (“Although many types of
policies affect innovation, no universally accepted nomenclature or taxonomy
summarizes or describes them.”).
14
See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, INDUCED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND
CLIMATE POLICY 3 (Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change 2004) (“The free
enterprise system encourages technological change by offering significant
rewards to inventions that yield a competitive advantage in the marketplace.”).
15
RON PERNICK & CLINT WILDER, THE CLEAN TECH REVOLUTION 6 (2007).
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existing without any government prodding, will encourage natural
technological advancement.
¶5
One clear example of market-driven advances in clean technology
is the development of solar energy. 16 The cost of installing solar panels
once far outweighed the financial benefits of using solar energy over fossil
fuels. 17 Aware of the potential market, entrepreneurs sought to develop the
technology necessary to make solar an affordable energy alternative. 18
Progress, largely attributed to private investment, occurred, and solar has
become an increasingly viable energy source. 19 The costs of photovoltaic
arrays have decreased markedly. 20 Furthermore, the fact that solar energy is
immune from the price fluctuations of fossil fuels (sunlight is free), is a
major factor in the financial equation. 21
¶6
The technological advances made in solar power were derived
through private investment and occurred without legal assistance. 22
Nevertheless, the fact that clean technologies are able to develop without
government influence does not mean that there is no role for lawmakers. 23
There is substantial evidence indicating that laws designed to induce
technological advancements often serve to increase the rate of technological
change or reduce the costs of change. 24 Were we to have the luxury of
having the time to allow for the natural market-driven development of clean
technology, these economic incentives would suffice. Unfortunately,
because of the urgency of the situation, some degree of government
involvement is necessary.

II. INDIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE LAWS
¶7
Pure market forces will only go so far in encouraging technological
advancement. One easy way for the government to bolster investment in
new clean technologies is to send policy signals indicating the economic
value of clean energy. I refer to this category as “indirect consequences” of
climate change laws that do not include specific provisions related to
16

INSLEE & HENDRICKS, supra note 6, at 68, 73. But see NORDHAUS &
SHELLENBERGER, supra note 4, at 122 (crediting the initial stimulus for solar
development to government-sponsored incentives).
17
INSLEE & HENDRICKS, supra note 6, at 68, 73.
18
Id. at 68.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
PERNICK & WILDER, supra note 15, at 7.
22
See GOULDER, supra note 14, at 9.
23
Id.
24
See id. at 13–16 (describing technical studies concluding that “induced
technological change” works and often has more efficient results than
technological change occurring in the absence of public policy).
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technological improvement. 25 Under this method, the government “pulls”
technological advance rather than “pushes” it through more direct means. 26
¶8
Climate change laws can indirectly spur technological advancement
in two major ways. First, by signaling the value of clean energy, laws can
encourage private investment in research and development specifically
aimed at creating new technology. 27 Second, the simple increase in
frequency of clean technology use will lead to technological advance as
there become greater opportunities for innovation. 28
¶9
Carbon cap-and-trade and carbon taxing are two examples of such
indirect policies. 29 These policies can signal the economic value of
developing clean technologies, encouraging private investors to pump
money into research and development. 30 By creating laws that regulate
climate change and restrict the ability to emit carbon, the government
imposes costs on dirty technologies. Under such policies, the government
creates market incentives to develop cheap, carbon-neutral technologies that

25

In their analysis of technology policies, Alic, Mowery, and Rubin lay out two
separate categories that I essentially collapse into a single “indirect
consequences of climate change laws” category. See ALIC, MOWERY & RUBIN,
supra note 12, at 16. One of Alic, Mowery, and Rubin’s categories is “a
collection of policies that directly or indirectly supports commercialization and
adoption, or indirectly supports development.” Id. The other consists of
“policies that foster technology diffusion through information and learning.” Id.
For the purposes of this iBrief, I do not find it necessary to subdivide this
category in such a manner.
26
See GOULDER, supra note 14, at 3–4 (describing how indirect “pull” policies
“stimulate[] technological change by increasing the reward (cost savings) for
discovering a process that allows reduced consumption of [dirty] fuels, which
[become] more expensive”). “Push” policies are discussed in Parts III and IV,
infra.
27
See PERNICK & WILDER, supra note 15, at 247 (stating that “venture
capitalists ranked policy as their number two reason for investing in clean tech
in California, and 91% said favorable public policy is a key driver for clean-tech
business and investing”).
28
See ALIC, MOWERY & RUBIN, supra note 12, at 14 (“Incremental
improvements come from multiple sources, many of which, such as learning-bydoing and learning-by-using, do not depend on formal R&D.”).
29
Carbon tax policies involve placing a tax on the emission of carbon dioxide.
Cap-and-trade policies establish a limit on the total amount of carbon dioxide
allowed to be released into the atmosphere and allotting permits to emit based
on the limit. Actors who emit less than their permits allow are able to sell their
excess allowances to others.
30
See, e.g., NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 4, at 120–21 (explaining
how cap-and-trade “could, if done right, generate billions of dollars in private
investment for cleaner sources of energy”).
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would not be subject to emissions regulations or taxes. 31 The message sent
to the business community is that clean technologies are insulated from
these external expenses. This method of encouraging technological
innovation does not directly entice scientists and engineers to start
inventing, but rather indirectly sends the message to investors that clean
technology is a promising economic industry.
¶10
Cap-and-trade plans are currently the most popular proposals being
offered by politicians. Among 2008 presidential nominees, Barack Obama
has plans to auction permits for 100% of the nation’s carbon dioxide
emissions, 32 and John McCain also supports a cap-and-trade system. 33
Although McCain has been vague on the details of his plan while on the
campaign trail, 34 as a senator he has authored numerous cap-and-trade
bills. 35

Multiple cap-and-trade bills have also been introduced in Congress
recently. 36 Although the exact forms of these proposals differ, the common
goal is to firmly limit greenhouse gas emissions to create a financial market
for the ability to emit. Though not as popular, proposals to place a tax on
carbon emissions would have similar results on spurring technological
development by increasing the economic costs of releasing greenhouse
gases. 37
¶11

¶12
Policies that aim to increase the cost of carbon emissions are likely
the most powerful way to indirectly spur technological advance.
Nevertheless, other types of laws that address climate change can also have
31

For a brief economic explanation of cap-and-trade and carbon tax policies, see
Environmental Economics, Econ 101: Carbon Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade,
http://www.env-econ.net/carbon_tax_vs_capandtrade.html (last visited Oct. 8,
2008).
32
Barack Obama, Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Real Leadership for a
Clean Energy Future, Oct. 8, 2007,
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/10/08/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_2
8.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
33
Climate Change, http://www.johnmccain.com/ (follow “Issues” dropdown
box to “Climate Change”) (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
34
See id. (merely stating that he “believe[s] "cap and trade" is the best way to
manage cost and maximize benefits”).
35
Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong.
(2005); Climate Stewardship Act of 2005, S. 342, 109th Cong. (2005); The
Emission Reductions Incentive Act of 2001, S. 1781, 107th Cong. (2001).
36
E.g., America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007);
Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007); Climate
Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. (2007).
37
See, e.g., Save Our Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 2069, 110th Cong. (2007);
America’s Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2007, H.R. 3416, 110th Cong.
(2007).
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the effect of signaling the value of engaging in technological research. In
this regard, many states have taken the lead in implementing innovative
policies. 38 California, in particular, has been the most visible in its efforts
to tackle climate change. 39 In many ways, California has taken
international leadership regarding climate change, often acting more like a
nation-state than as a provincial government. 40
¶13
Although the federal government has not been nearly as active as
the states in trying to establish a climate-conscious culture, a number of
bills relating to climate change will likely have some impact on the
development of new technology. For example, proposals to allow for net
metering of homes—allowing individuals to put energy into the grid—
would likely encourage advancements in solar technology. 41 In addition,
bills that focus on energy efficiency would probably have the effect of
encouraging the development of better, more efficient technologies. 42 In
short, just about any policy that aims to reduce the effects of climate change
can indirectly promote the development of green technology. By increasing
the value of clean technology and signaling a long-term lucrative market for
green industry in the future, climate change laws bolster market incentives
to invest in clean technology.

III. DIRECT GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
While market forces occurring both naturally and as a result of
indirect government policies will encourage the development of many green
¶14

38

The Environmental Protection Agency maintains a website detailing state
responses to climate change. See EPA, Global Warming Actions: State,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ActionsState.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2008).
39
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 399.11–399.20 (West 2007) (requiring
that a certain level of energy production must come from renewable sources).
40
See, e.g., Press Release, Gov. Schwarzenegger, British Prime Minister Tony
Blair Sign Historic Agreement to Collaborate on Climate Change, Clean Energy,
July 31, 2006, http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/press-release/2770/ (last visited Jan.
31, 2008).
41
See Solar Opportunity and Local Access Rights Act, H.R. 2848, 110th Cong.
(2007) (providing for the establishment of net metering to “promote energy
independence and self-sufficiency”); Solar Opportunity and Local Access Rights
Act, S. 1016, 110th Cong. (2007) (providing for the establishment of net
metering to promote efficiency).
42
See, e.g., Energy Efficiency Improvement Act, H.R. 3236, 110th Cong.
(2007); Smart Grid Facilitation Act of 2007, H.R. 3237, 110th Cong. (2007)
(establishing a more energy efficient grid called a “smart grid”); Federal Agency
Environmental Responsibility Act, S. 1072, 110th Cong. (2007) (requiring
greater efficiency in federal buildings).
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technologies that offer low-risk returns, more radical technological
advancements are needed to fully address climate change. The previous
two methods will not encourage investment in instances in which high
initial start-up costs and high risks of low economic return may hinder the
development of certain technologies. 43 One method of injecting a bit more
inducement to invent would be through direct, government-sponsored
financial incentives such as grants and tax benefits.
¶15
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 includes many
direct, government-provided financial incentives to engage in scientific
research associated with developing technologies to fight climate change.44
However, the scope of these funds is limited to particular field of research
and development. Specifically, the legislation provides funding for research
and development in: biofuels, 45 solar energy, 46 geothermal energy,47 marine
and hydrokinetic energy, 48 carbon capture and sequestration, 49 and various
other specific, small-scale areas of research. 50
¶16
Many other bills proposed in 2007 also involve limited availability
of research funds. The America’s Domestic Fuels Act, for instance,
includes a grant to the Secretary of Energy for the specific purpose to study
the “use of coal gasification as an energy source in ethanol production.” 51

43

See NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 4, at 119 (“But regulation
cannot be the sole policy egg in the global warming basket, for without
investments to encourage technological breakthroughs, we won’t come close to
achieving the emissions reductions we need to stabilize the climate.”).
44
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121
Stat. 1492 (2007).
45
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 207,
221–34, 121 Stat. 1534–37 (2007).
46
Solar Energy Research and Advancement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140,
§§ 601–07, 121 Stat. 1675–78 (2007).
47
Advanced Geothermal Energy Research and Development Act of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110-140, §§ 611–25, 121 Stat. 1679–85 (2007). Geothermal energy
involves the use of “heat energy stored in the Earth’s crust that can be accessed
for direct use or electric power generation.” Id. § 612(5).
48
Marine and Hydrokinetic Renewable Energy Research and Development Act,
Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 631–36, 121 Stat. 1687–89 (2007). Marine and
hydrokinetic energy includes energy derived from waves, tides, currents, freeflowing water, and differentials in ocean temperatures. Id. at § 632. It excludes
hydroelectric power coming from dams, etc. Id.
49
Department of Energy Carbon Capture and Sequestration Research,
Development, and Demonstration Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 701–08
121 Stat. 1704–09 (2007).
50
See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, §§ 651–56, 121 Stat.
1696–704 (2007).
51
America’s Domestic Fuels Act, H.R. 931, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2007).
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Other proposals specify grants relating to research in: geothermal energy, 52
clean coal, 53 and ethanol. 54 Some bills take the approach of the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 and provide for multiple areas of
research. 55 However, those bills limit funding to further advancement of
existing technologies rather than encouraging revolutionary development.56
¶17
Of the cap-and-trade proposals submitted in 2007, both the
Lieberman-Warner 57 and the Bingaman-Specter 58 bills involve a direct
investment in technological research. Both plans allocate 28% of available
funds to “advanced coal and [carbon dioxide] sequestration,” 59 7% to
“cellulosic biomass ethanol,” 60 and 20% to “advanced technologies vehicle
manufacturing.” 61 In other words, more than half of available research goes
towards advancing existing technologies. For both bills, the remaining 45%
is dedicated to support a “zero or low-carbon energy technologies
program.” 62
¶18
This results-oriented zero or low-carbon energy technologies
program provides financial incentives for those who develop new
technologies that either result in zero or low-carbon energy solutions or in
high-efficiency products. 63 Programs such as these provide the best
opportunity for direct government funds to result in the creation of new
technologies. Although funding specifically targeted to the further
development of current technologies is certainly necessary, it is important to
52

Advanced Geothermal Energy Research and Development Act of 2007, H.R.
2304, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
53
Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
2008, H.R. 2641, 110th Cong. tit. III (2007).
54
Ethanol Infrastructure Expansion Act of 2007, S. 859, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007)
(providing funds for “feasibility studies”).
55
E.g., Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and Energy Efficiency Act of
2007, H.R. 2950, 110th Cong. (2007). This bill grants funding for research in:
bioenergy, id. § 122; renewable fuel, id. § 125; low-carbon fuels, id. § 132;
lightweight material for vehicles, id. § 241; smart grid technology, id. § 256;
marine and hydrokinetic renewable energy, id. § 292; carbon capture and
storage, id. § 302; and green buildings, id. § 435.
56
See supra note 55. Although it provides money for a wide range of research
projects, like the Renewable Fuels and Consumer Protection, the Energy
Efficiency Act of 2007 does not give funding for advanced research into new
solutions. Id.
57
See America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007).
58
See Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007).
59
S. 2191 § 4401(2)(A); S. 1766 § 401(a) (1)(B)(i).
60
S. 2191 § 4401(2)(B); S. 1766 § 401(a)(1)(B)(ii). The Bingaman-Specter bill
also includes “municipal solid waste deployment” in this 7% group. Id.
61
S. 2191 § 4401(3); S. 1766 § 401(a)(1)(C).
62
S. 2191 § 4401(1); S. 1766 § 401(a)(1)(A).
63
S. 2191 § 4402(b); S. 1766 § 401(b)(2).
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keep in mind the importance of encouraging the invention of breakthrough
technologies that are essential to adequately deal with the climate crisis.
Because revolutionary technologies by their very nature do not yet exist or
are in conceptual infancy, their development via the method of direct,
government-sponsored financial incentives should provide for flexibility in
the scope of research. The zero or low-carbon energy technologies program
does this by attaching funding to the end result of lowering carbon emission
rather than dictating the means by which this is to happen.
¶19
Another cap-and-trade bill uses direct government funds with the
purpose of promoting new technologies. The McCain-Lieberman Climate
Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007 establishes a “Climate Technology
Financing Board.” 64 This board is charged with providing financial
assistance to those working to create new, innovative solutions to climate
change. 65 In determining which projects to fund, the Climate Technology
Financing Board is to consider “the extent to which the project represents
the construction of the first generation of facilities that use substantially
new technology.” 66 This provides incentives to invent new technologies.
Furthermore, the program aims to speed the development of new
technologies by focusing on projects that are in need of financial support
beyond what the market will provide. Specifically, the board must consider
“the likelihood that assistance . . . would enable the project to proceed at an
earlier date than the project would otherwise be able to proceed without
such assistance” when selecting projects to fund. 67

IV. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP
¶20
Some degree of technological advancement is sure to result from
any and all of the three methods mentioned previously. However, the big
question is whether those advancements will be enough to sufficiently
address a problem that can easily turn into a crisis overnight. Because
climate change is such a unique problem with potentially catastrophic
consequences, many commentators argue that nothing should be left to
chance. 68 Therefore, there are increasing calls for major government

64

Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. § 251
(2007).
65
See id. §§ 251(a), 251(c)(2).
66
Id. § 251(c)(2)(D).
67
Id. § 251(c)(2)(C).
68
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 163
(2004); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST CASE SCENARIOS 119 (2007). But see BJORN
LOMBORG, COOL IT 123–24 (2007) (arguing that it is not worthwhile to plan for
a catastrophe caused by climate change).
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spur

¶21
Existing federal law falls far short of establishing the major
institutional measures that are called for by those advocating an Apollo-like
approach to climate change. For instance, although the principal 2007
energy legislation takes some steps to encourage climate-related
technological development, it provides for no major institutional changes. 70
Two cap-and-trade bills—Sanders-Boxer71 and Kerry-Snowe72 —include an
institutional apparatus that somewhat resembles the type of initiative needed
to truly assist in the creation of breakthrough technologies, but falls far
short of the ideal institutional structure. 73
¶22
Perhaps the closest thing to an Apollo proposal to come out of
Congress is the establishment of an “Advanced Research Projects Agency –
Energy” (ARPA-E) 74 Modeled after the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), ARPA-E simply aims “to overcome the longterm and high-risk technological barriers in the development of energy
technologies.” 75 DARPA was created for the purpose of encouraging
defense and military-related research and development. 76 DARPA had
many successes, including the development of crucial space technologies as
well as the creation of the internet. 77 ARPA-E is currently the climate
change plan that best matches the type of institutional structure needed to
meet Apollo-like standards. However, as the ARPA-E proposal stands, it
lacks many crucial characteristics that would be part of a truly effective
institution of this category. 78

69

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
71
Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007).
72
Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007).
73
Specifically, the R&D institution mentioned in these bills would be subsidiary
to existing organizations and would be charged mainly with advancing existing
technologies rather than encouraging revolutionary inventions. S. 309 § 711; S.
485 § 705.
74
America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in
Technology, Education, and Science Act, S. 761, 110th Cong. § 2005 (2007).
75
Id. § 2005(b).
76
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA Over the Years,
http://www.darpa.mil/body/overtheyears.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
77
DARPA, DARPA’s 50th Anniversary, History,
http://www.darpa.mil/DARPA50thevent/history.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
78
To truly be effective, a climate change equivalent to Apollo must be as
expansive, goal-driven, and fully supported as the Kennedy-initiated lunar
mission. This will require a massive initiative involving the creation of a
government climate institution analogous to NASA. As with Apollo, it will also
require strategic coordination with the private sector, academic institutions, and
70
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California has established an institutional structure that comes close
to fitting within this fourth category of climate change technology policies.
The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 mandated the
establishment of the Global Warming Economic and Technology
Advancement Advisory Committee (ETAAC), a branch of the California
Air Resources Board. 79 The ETAAC is given the responsibility to:
¶23

advise [the Air Resources Board] on activities that will facilitate
investment in and implementation of technological research and
development opportunities including, but not limited to, identifying
new technologies, research, demonstration projects, funding
opportunities, developing state, national, and international partnerships
and technology transfer opportunities, and identifying and assessing
research and advanced technology investment and incentive
opportunities that will assist in the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions. 80

The members of this committee have varied backgrounds and expertise. 81
They are appointed “based on their knowledge and expertise in fields of
business, technology research and development, climate change, and
economics.” 82
The United States has a long history of investing enormously in
scientific progress as a means of tackling crises. For instance, faced with
World War II security concerns, the U.S. initiated the Manhattan Project, a
government-sponsored program charged with developing advanced nuclear
¶24

think tanks. Under ARPA-E, entities in these sectors can qualify for grants and
contracts, but would have little say in the agency itself. H.R. 364, 110th Cong. §
2(d) (2007). Unlike Apollo, the ideal climate change institutional structure will
also require cooperation and coordination with actors beyond the U.S. borders.
To be most effective, therefore, an Apollo project for climate change must not
only involve a massive domestic effort, but must also allow for and encourage
strong international collaboration. ARPA-E falls short of this component since
it does not explicitly provide for international coordination. See id. § 2(f)
(providing for coordination among federal entities but not mentioning
international coordination).
79
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE div. 25.5, §§ 38500–99 (West 2007).
80
Id. § 38591.
81
See generally Cal. EPA Air Res. Bd., Economic and Technology
Advancement Advisory Committee Members,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/etaac/etaac_members.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2008)
(providing biographical summaries of the members of ETAAC).
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Cal. EPA Air Res. Bd., Economic and Technology Advancement Advisory
Committee (ETAAC), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/etaac/etaac.htm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2008).
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technology as quickly as possible. 83 The urgency the world currently faces
in avoiding an impending climate catastrophe parallels the urgency that the
United States felt in the need to secure the capacity to build atomic bombs
during World War II. 84 The Manhattan Project was a bold, proactive
response to the crisis. The brightest minds were brought together, including
thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians. 85 The project was
enormous and “was directed to one overriding goal: the production of
nuclear weapons.” 86
¶25
Nevertheless, there are some clear differences between the
Manhattan Project and the institutional composition of an analogous climate
change program. One major difference is that secrecy was paramount to the
success of the Manhattan Project. 87 Since climate change is by its very
nature a global problem, there is no need to hide scientific findings and
technological progress. In fact, openness and collaboration will likely be
beneficial in reaching solutions to the crisis. In addition, the Manhattan
Project was driven by a single technological goal, whereas for climate
change, it is probably best to encourage the development of countless
different types of technologies. A large government apparatus worked for
the narrow technological goal of creating an atomic weapon, but may not
work as well in this situation. In addition, such a massive government
project may not be the most efficient way to accomplish the same results
that could be achieved through the three more basic methods of encouraging
technological progress. 88
¶26
Twenty years after the Manhattan Project, the United States
government once again took decisive action in assisting in the creation of a
technological breakthrough. In 1961, President Kennedy announced a goal
to send a man to the moon within a decade. 89 Determined to succeed, the
U.S. government established an institutional apparatus that would provide
the best environment for the development of space technology. NASA
collaborated with private industry and university researchers in a nexus that
“enable[d] the large-scale technological development needed for Project

83

See HUGHES, supra note 8, at 53.
See id. at 53–55.
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Id. at 9.
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Id.
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Id. at 53.
88
See Yang & Oppenheimer, supra note 10, at 200.
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President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Urgent
National Needs 4 (May 26, 1961), available at
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Spee
ches/JFK/Urgent+National+Needs+Page+4.htm (“I believe that this nation
should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a
man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth.”).
84
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Apollo.” 90 On July 20, 1969, Apollo XI landed on the moon,
accomplishing Kennedy’s mission two years early. 91
As referenced earlier in this iBrief, the Apollo Program is a popular
source of inspiration for climate change proposals. 92 Despite this, most
Apollo-like proposals appear to have only superficial similarities with the
original Apollo Program. For instance, the original Apollo was effective in
part because it involved strategic coordination with the private sector,
academic institutions, and think tanks. Under ARPA-E, however, entities in
these sectors have little say in the agency. 93
¶27

¶28
It is also questionable whether Apollo is actually an appropriate
model to follow for climate change. For example, unlike Apollo, the ideal
climate change institutional structure will also require cooperation and
coordination with actors beyond the U.S. borders. Apollo was born as part
of the Cold War space race between two nation-states. It was in essence
part of a giant contest between the two superpowers of the time. The
climate change crisis is fundamentally different in that the entire world risks
impending peril from a global phenomenon. To be most effective,
therefore, an Apollo-like project for climate change must not only involve a
massive domestic effort, but must also allow for and encourage strong
international collaboration. ARPA-E falls short of this component since it
does not explicitly provide for international coordination. 94
¶29
Furthermore, most proposals selling themselves as “Apollo”-like
also lack the necessary domestic and international scale and scope. 95 In
addition, the Apollo Program shared the Manhattan Project’s single-goal
mission model. As discussed earlier, climate change is different in that a
multiple technologies solution is likely the best option, and it is unclear as
to whether creating a massive government institution is the most effective
way to accomplish this. Moreover, it is questionable as to whether a
government-controlled institution is the most efficient investment of
resources if the same results can be reached under any of the three less
intensive approaches to inducing technological advance.
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Eligar Sadeh, Public Administration of the Space Program, in SPACE POLITICS
supra note 7, at 129, 143.
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NASA, The Apollo 11 Mission,
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/history/apollo/apollo11/index.html (last visited Jan.
22, 2008).
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See, e.g., HENDRICKS & INSLEE, supra note 6, at 2–3.
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See America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in
Technology, Education, and Science Act, S. 761, 110th Cong. § 2005 (2007).
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612 (2007).
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CONCLUSION
¶30
Technology is an essential component of any effective climate
change solution. The drivers of technological advancement can come from
a range of policy methods. The easiest strategy is to simply allow the free
market system to work its course. Private investors will continue to
naturally be drawn to a growing market for clean technology. As a second
alternative, the government can encourage private investment by indirectly
signaling the increasing value of clean technology under climate-friendly
legal frameworks. If costs are assigned to environmentally unsound
practices, incentives will form to create technology that will allow for
cheaper compliance to climate-friendly laws. A third approach would be
for the government to take a more proactive role in encouraging
technological advancement by directly funding research and development.
To this point, clean technology has been driven by these three types of
tactics.
¶31
Recently, however, there have been calls for a more intensive
government-initiated method: establishing a specialized institutional
structure to focus on the development of revolutionary technological
solutions to climate change. The United States has done this in the past to
meet exceptional scientific challenges. Both the Manhattan Project and the
Apollo Program were successful in meeting their extraordinary goals.
However, comparisons to Manhattan and Apollo only go so far. It is
questionable as to whether a similar massive government initiative is the
most appropriate way to encourage climate change technological
development.

In short, a wide array of policy options is available to spur the
creation of clean technology. Relying solely on market forces will likely be
insufficient, and establishing a large-scale Apollo-like project for energy is
controversial and has some drawbacks. The best policy option likely
involves a blend of all four types of policies, with more of a concentration
on the second and third categories—indirect and direct government
encouragement of technological development through climate change
legislation.

¶32

